Before, during, after - The Square Ball 6/2/23
LOST IN CHARGE
Written by: Moxcowhite • Daniel Chapman
The problem with sending Jesse Marsch out of Elland Road is
that he takes with him the credibility that, following promotion in 2020,
should have ensured Andrea Radrizzani’s ownership was written gratefully into
Leeds United history. Choosing a coach to follow Marcelo Bielsa was always
going to be the key test of what Radrizzani, Angus Kinnear and Victor Orta
brought to Elland Road, and with the grintastic group photo they gathered for
with their new man in March, they put everything on the line with him. Now he’s
gone, in circumstances that feel familiar.
For Jesse Marsch read Thomas Christiansen, and read a doomed
repeat of the strategy Victor Orta and Andrea Radrizzani screamed their way out
of in summer 2018. The idea in summer 2017 was that the board wanted a manager
who would grow and improve alongside the team, developing young players who
would become worth big transfer fees in the process. So they identified Thomas
Christiansen for his potential and brought him to the Championship, hoping to
ride the wave of his ascent. What they discovered then was that, after fifteen
years in the wilderness, Leeds United was not a club that could wait for a
young coach to get his act together, or Jay-Roy Grot’s act together, whether
that coach was Christiansen or their second attempt, Paul Heckingbottom. It
took Orta, shouting his way through dinner at the end of his and Radrizzani’s
first season in charge, to make the owner understand that Leeds United Football
Club had used all its reserves of patience long before they’d even arrived.
Leeds changed course — Bielsa — yet somehow, after seeing
how well that worked, changed back. Jesse Marsch is a young coach who was
identified for his potential and brought to the Premier League so he could
develop young players while Leeds rode the wave of his ascent, etc etc. But an
inexperienced coach with room for improvement, by definition, has flaws that
need time to be worked out. And the Premier League trapdoor is an even less
forgiving red line than the promotion places in the Championship. The problem
with this approach is that it needs a unicorn: a coach who is young with faults
that can be solved with time, who is also immediately proficient enough to stay
safe in the Premier League. It’s not just a unicorn, it’s a contradiction.
That the board went back to this version of their 2017 plan,
after all that happened with Bielsa that was good, makes it hard to think they
learned anything from El Loco’s time at Leeds. At Bielsa’s unveiling,
Radrizzani talked about wanting the new manager to change the culture of the
club. This wasn’t just a coaching role, the owner wanted Leeds to benefit from
all of Bielsa’s knowledge and experience. And Leeds did. And as soon as the board
had shown Bielsa the door, despite claiming they would continue his ‘legacy’,
they went back to how they were doing things before. Radrizzani’s concept of
Bielsa’s legacy is naming the training ground after him, attaching a brass
nameplate to a door through which Bielsa would recognise nothing of what he
built. Was this a rejection of Bielsa’s philosophy, or just a poverty of ideas?
One of the key factors that Angus Kinnear, speaking to The
Square Ball last August, put forward about Bielsa’s downfall at Leeds was that
the head coach had too much control — ‘dominant … dictatorial … extreme …
principled’. That at times it felt like the board were working for Bielsa,
unable to influence him. Kinnear’s farewell programme notes included an
anecdote about Bielsa wanting a putting green installed for the players, and
Kinnear refusing to allow it. (From Instagram, incidentally, Leeds’ players
absolutely love golf. Perhaps the coach who installed a games room and
relaxation area at Thorp Arch was onto something here.) This seemed a
stupefying, petty tale; after saying yes to so much Bielsa wanted, and seeing
the results, why draw the line there? My only conclusion was that Kinnear felt
like he had to start drawing lines somewhere. Somebody from the board had to start
standing up to this coach who wanted, and always got, things his own way. Over
less trivial matters, Kinnear sounded much the same: Bielsa didn’t want to sign
this player or that player, he wouldn’t change this tactic, he wouldn’t alter
this aspect of training. Essentially, the board felt Bielsa was too powerful,
and not listening to their ideas. They felt that Leeds United would fail if
their input was not taken, and if Bielsa was too ‘principled’ to heed the
board, they would have to sack him.
Now we’ve seen Leeds United as owned by Radrizzani both
before and after Bielsa was in charge. And we’ve seen that Bielsa’s reign was
the only time Leeds United was good. Having Bielsa in control might have
bruised egos, and his demands for players and facilities might have startled
the bank manager, but Bielsa got results. We heard a lot, after he was sacked,
about all the signings Bielsa refused to accept, the tactical alterations he
wouldn’t make. We never heard, because Bielsa won’t speak of it, about what
plans he did have, what proposals he did put forward. We don’t know what Bielsa
wanted to do next, at Leeds. We only know he didn’t want Harry Winks in
January, or to take any of the board’s other suggestions. And it looks less and
less, as the months have gone by, like he was wrong.
It also feels less and less like coincidence that things
went wrong for Bielsa at Leeds after Orta had chosen Marsch as his successor,
after Kinnear had decided three years of Bielsa was too much to sustain, after
Radrizzani had spoken to Bielsa and got him to agree that the club had to
either ‘change the coach or change the players’ and then, in summer 2021, did
neither. After a putting green became an indulgence too far. After the point
when the board felt Bielsa had been having his way for too long, but before the
point when they had enough courage to do anything about it except stop doing as
he asked.
Leeds United has been here before. In the 1960s, Don Revie
had a close relationship with the chairman who convinced him to take the
manager’s job, Harry Reynolds, but after Reynolds stepped down from the board
and then died, Elland Road became a lonelier place for Revie. The new board
liked the club’s success, but they didn’t like Revie being given all the credit
for it. He was their employee, but in public the board just looked like
anonymous suits who signed cheques and followed their underling’s orders. Revie
was on the verge of leaving several times, and when he finally took the England
job, the board wasted no time asserting their own authority. Now it was time
for the public to see who Leeds United’s real authors of success were. They
hired Brian Clough, and 44 days later when they’d sacked him, they had spent
more on transfers in those six weeks than in the entire time Revie was running
the club. If all Revie had let them do was write cheques, at least they’d been
smaller ones.
I don’t know if Radrizzani, Kinnear and Orta fell into that
trap, surrounded by murals of their employee, living in the shadows of his
worldwide fame, always being asked about the genius of his methods and never
about their own. But after they sacked Bielsa they were alone with their genius
to flex, and eleven months later they don’t even have Jesse Marsch to front up
for them anymore. We’ve got an answer to what a post-Bielsa Leeds looks like,
and it’s a mirror image of the pre-Bielsa Leeds. Thomas Christiansen’s season
in charge ended on 4th February, Jesse Marsch’s on the 6th. Radrizzani’s second
go at doing things his way has exposed the need for what he had in between (no,
not Heckingbottom) — someone else in control, someone commensurate to the task,
someone who knows what they’re doing. If he liked what Jesse Marsch was
planning to do, that was the problem. What we suspected before Bielsa has been
confirmed by the months after him: when Radrizzani, Kinnear and Orta are
allowed to be the smartest guys in the room, Leeds United end up in trouble.
The trouble with the boardroom at Leeds now is that we don’t
know which guys are calling the shots on the next appointment. What sort of
coach comes next, short term or long term? And which side of the ownership will
appoint and/or unveil them? The short term of Radrizzani that’s due to end in
summer, or the long term of 49ers Enterprises that’s due to start? The
complexity of who is in charge worked best when it had a simple answer.