How Leeds United fell short: Farke’s full-on first season, 49ers’ influence and what now? — The Athletic 26/5/24
Phil Hay
The middle of last August was a pressure point for Leeds
United, and a time when the club’s season seemed in most danger of spinning out
of control.
Willy Gnonto, their Italian winger, had been ostracised
after asking to leave. A legal dispute involving Luis Sinisterra left a second
of their more valuable attacking assets to train in isolation. Others in the
building were agitating to get out and incoming transfer business was
incomplete. In numerous respects, Leeds were a classic of the genre of a side
picking up the pieces after Premier League relegation.
Around that time, one of their players went to Daniel Farke
to discuss the manager’s selection policy and gripe about who had been playing
where in the early weeks of the Championship term. Farke listened and then
spoke his mind. I’ve got people on strike, he said. I’ve got people who want to
be elsewhere. I’ve got a half-baked squad and the window closes soon. But if
you’re not happy and you want to leave, it’s no problem for me to sell you
tomorrow. Just say the word.
That was that, and the conversation behind closed doors
would be a marker for how Leeds would operate on Farke’s watch. The promotion
he envisaged, the promotion he had all but promised in private, was not going
to be won by committee. The club would revolve around him: his calls, his
rules, his prerogative to have the final say on anything affecting the dressing
room. In that way, promotion would live or die.
Leeds went with it, investing themselves fully in Farke and
trusting his confidence. For many months, their faith promised to pay off. But
a costly wobble at the season’s business end manifested itself in a play-off
final defeat to Southampton today, a feeling the club know so well.
In their mind’s eye, Leeds knew how they wanted this
afternoon to look: the scenes of euphoria theirs to soak up, rather than
Southampton’s. Instead, after a 1-0 loss, Archie Gray was in tears. Ilia Gruev
was in tears. Farke’s players wondered around in a daze with no idea of where
to put themselves. And old truism at Elland Road was proven again. Leeds,
plainly, cannot hack the play-offs.
Another summer of reflection awaits ahead of another year in
the wilderness.
Farke’s insistence on having autonomy at Elland Road can be
traced back to the earliest conversations he had with Leeds when the club were
trying to decide which manager would work best for them in the Championship.
Of all the candidates spoken to, Farke exuded the most
self-confidence. Leeds’ interview panel was fully stacked, including new
chairman Paraag Marathe and Jed York, one of the most senior figures behind the
San Francisco 49ers NFL franchise and a major Leeds shareholder, but Farke
chose not to wow them with a long presentation about tactics, vision or
philosophy. In his opinion, which he expressed openly, two prior Championship
titles won with Norwich City were proof of his suitability.
ast month, when Farke said in a press conference those two
titles were “no guarantee” he would take Leeds up, a staff member with
knowledge of the summer’s interview process — who, like others who spoke to The
Athletic for this article, asked not to be named to avoid damaging
relationships — chuckled at the comment. A guarantee of promotion was more or
less what Farke had given the panel in June, but what he did not realise was
that Leeds were about to head into an unprecedented Championship year, a season
which generated one of the tightest races for automatic promotion on record.
Farke, understandably, portrayed himself as a Championship
specialist, though he spent more time talking about wanting to prove himself in
the Premier League. Leeds, after 12 torrid months and the loss of their place
in the top flight, were seduced by the thought of stable, dependable presence
in the dug-out. Last season, Jesse Marsch had fallen victim to the flaws of his
counter-pressing ideals. He was clinging on long before he was sacked in
February 2023. A short stint as Marsch’s replacement broke Spaniard Javi
Gracia, to the extent that the Spaniard was virtually in tears after a 4-1
beating at Bournemouth and struggled to bring himself to talk to the squad.
Leeds sacked him the following day.
Sam Allardyce, a veteran of English club football, saw the
club through their final four matches but the die was cast and Leeds were
cooked. One source explained how after a 3-1 defeat to West Ham United in their
penultimate game, Allardyce “went into the dressing room and pretty much said,
‘Well done lads, you’ve fucked it.'” He wasn’t wrong. Tottenham Hotspur at home
was all Leeds had left, and Allardyce could tell that no miracle was coming.
Three years in the Premier League ended with Rasmus Kristensen marking ghosts
as Spurs sealed a 4-1 win in injury-time.
Within a fortnight of relegation, a deal was finalised for
long-time chairman Andrea Radrizzani to sell Leeds to the 49ers Enterprises
investment fund, of which Marathe was the front man. Though a 100 per cent
takeover would not be formally completed until September, EFL approval for it
arrived on July 17.
By then, the 49ers were already running Leeds, with
Radrizzani out of the picture and involved in a buy-out of Sampdoria in Italy.
A boardroom in which Radrizzani and 49ers Enterprises had been increasingly at
odds was now the domain of one single shareholder — and free from divisions.
The 49ers are regarded as inherently strategic in the way
they run their NFL operation. They see long-term planning as a virtue and
invest heavily in data, both financially and operationally. With Radrizzani
gone from Elland Road, their ideas and methods were free to be applied to Leeds
with more vigour than in their days as a minority stakeholder.
The Sportsology Group, an analytics firm for whom Chelsea’s
former director of football operations Mike Forde is CEO, did some groundwork
on the managerial hunt. It was Forde who had first recommended Leeds to Marathe
as an investment opportunity back in 2018. One of the individuals in the 49ers’
investment group, ex-baseballer Michael Schwimer, was the founder of Big League
Advantage, a U..S company which specialises in sports data and predictive
analysis.
The 49ers teed up Robbie Evans, a man who had worked for
them previously, to come into Elland Road as chief strategy officer, with a
focus on the club’s playing side and the use of data. Sources have told The
Athletic that recruitment will be ‘Moneyball’ orientated to an extent, with the
aim of ensuring that analysis combined with the club’s budget finds better
value for money.
In picking a new manager, however, there was only so much
time the 49ers could devote to playing the field. Negotiating EFL approval for
their takeover and dealing with Radrizzani took up the first seven weeks of the
summer. Farke was not appointed until July 4, a matter of hours before Leeds’
first pre-season training session. United would not complete their first
signing, midfielder Ethan Ampadu, for another 15 days.
The 49ers respected Farke’s record. They accepted the need to be efficient in making an appointment. Ideally, they would have preferred to appoint someone to the technical director’s role, partially replacing Victor Orta in a revised structure, before choosing a first-team boss but time was too short, and Gretar Steinsson stepped into that job after Farke’s arrival.
One of Steinsson’s rivals for the technical director
position thought Leeds had made a mistake by not going after Steve Cooper as
head coach. Cooper was under contract at Nottingham Forest but seemed forever
on the verge of being sacked. Making that happen, though, would have taken
patience and compensation, neither of which Leeds could afford in spades.
United made attempts to court Graham Potter, fresh from his dismissal by
Chelsea, but failed to convince him to engage seriously with them.
With the decision to appoint Farke made, pragmatism was
applied in equal measure to the club’s recruitment of new players. In the
Premier League, Leeds had taken too many risks. Some, like Brazilian wizard
Raphinha, proved exceptionally good business. Others, like many of the
purchases made for Marsch, did not. Leeds have not commented on the news last
month that they had withdrawn their appeal over an award of £24.5million in
compensation to Jean-Kevin Augustin, a consequence of their shambolic move to
sign the striker in 2020, but it might be that accepting defeat in that case —
one they seemed destined to lose — was indicative of the 49ers trying to cut
the nonsense and face facts.
In the transfer market, Leeds went safe, solid and fairly
heavy: Ampadu for £7million ($8.8m) from Chelsea, Joel Piroe from Swansea City
for £10.5million, Glen Kamara from Rangers for £5million, Joe Rodon on loan
from Tottenham Hotspur. Farke insisted on approving all of their business —
which was why he had specifically asked for the more old-fashioned title of
manager, rather than head coach. He looked to his old club Norwich with bids
for Max Aarons and Kenny McLean, neither of which came off. He took Sam Byram
on a free transfer following the defender’s release from Carrow Road, a
transfer Leeds might have opposed had Farke not been on the scene. As Byram
admitted himself, his injury record was a big red flag.
Farke imposed himself in other ways too, none of them hugely
unconventional and all done for a reason. The canteen at Leeds’ Thorp Arch
training ground was marked out as an area for players and backroom staff only.
Even club directors weren’t allowed to wander in as they pleased. Changes were
made to the arrangements for the squad to sign charity merchandise, to avoid
distractions around training. Everyone was expected to sit down together before
pre-match meals began. Farke also tried to manage the PR in certain instances.
Revealing in advance that first-choice centre-back Pascal Struijk would miss
Leeds’ home game against Plymouth Argyle in November because of a hernia
operation was done deliberately to stop his absence from the teamsheet
affecting the atmosphere at kick-off.
He would insist at short notice on flying to Millwall away,
even though trains had already been booked. He would be adamant that getting
through a crazy spell of travelling in February — Swansea City away, Bristol
City away and Plymouth away twice in the space of 15 days — would require
planes and additional hotel stays. Leeds had the budget to grant those requests
and were repaid with four away wins. Up until the end of March, when they hit
the top of the table for the first time, his team seemed to be peaking
perfectly.
People who have watched the 49ers operate since they took
control of Leeds say much the same thing: that they are hands-on and attentive
but not inclined to interfere unduly. To quote an individual who saw the Ampadu
signing play out: “They knew what they knew about football, and they were
sensible enough to know that they knew very little. Because of that, they put
the right football people in place.” Nick Hammond, hired as a transfer
consultant, was a key figure in the summer rebuild: well connected, a good
communicator and difficult to ruffle. But nothing went over the line without
crossing Farke’s desk first.
Farke’s style of man-management can be strict and, on
occasions, stubborn but he is not prone to reading the riot act regularly. One
of his assistants, head of performance Chris Domogalla, is said to play bad cop
from time to time, though Leeds’ performances and results did not call for much
of that. The attention to detail was not on the level of Marcelo Bielsa’s, but
Farke’s tactics delivered points regularly. As one source said: “He tells you
what he wants and if you’re doing what he wants, he’s not going to hassle you.”
At certain junctures, however, he showed the capacity to be
ruthless. It was Farke’s decision to ban Gnonto from first-team training after
the Italian made it clear he wanted Leeds to accept bids for him from Everton.
It was Farke’s decision to isolate Sinisterra while the Colombian tried to
demonstrate to Leeds his contract legally entitled him to leave Elland Road on
loan (Sinisterra would later join Bournemouth on deadline day). In January,
Charlie Cresswell’s dissatisfaction at being Farke’s fourth-choice central
defender manifested itself in him being temporarily omitted from match-day
squads. Farke picked his fights carefully but picked them all the same.
His control over squad-building extended to the proposed
renewals of player contracts. At the outset of this season, veteran campaigners
Liam Cooper and Luke Ayling were under the impression, on the strength of
conversations with Leeds’ hierarchy, that they were both likely to receive an
extra year at the end of deals which expire this summer. As time went on, Farke
took a different view and saw less value in keeping them on board. Ayling left
on loan for Middlesbrough in January. Cooper will almost certainly leave Elland
Road as a free agent in the weeks ahead (although the defender appreciated the
opportunity of a farewell appearance in Leeds’ play-off semi-final against
Norwich City, and messaged Farke personally to thank him).
Under Farke, other players thrived in a big way. Daniel
James, a £25million signing in 2021, recovered from several years of rudderless
progress with 13 goals and seven assists. Crysencio Summerville’s influence
exploded so spectacularly that he was named Championship player of the year
last month. Georginio Rutter — very much the wrong signing for £30m when Leeds
were in deep trouble last season — came good, albeit at a level where a
£30million forward should. Rodon turned in the best campaign of his career and
Byram’s stints of service made him a savvy free transfer. Having allowed Gnonto
back into the fold, Farke saw the 20-year-old’s mojo resurface at the end of
January.
There is no denying that when the dust settled at the end of
last summer’s transfer window, Farke had one of the strongest squads in the
Championship. There is no denying either that the pursuit of automatic
promotion wobbled badly towards the end, scuppered horribly by a battering at
Queens Park Rangers on April 26. Though Farke had a dig at VAR and refereeing
decisions after the initial leg of their play-off against Norwich — “If we’d
used VAR (in the Championship) we’d wouldn’t be in the play-offs” — it was
equally true that Leeds blew repeated opportunities to finish first or second
regardless.
Defensively, in regular league fixtures, Farke’s side
deteriorated from the end of March onwards. Their finishing dropped off too.
Individual form dipped as collective effectiveness sagged. Was it fatigue? Was
it a loss of nerve? Was it end-zone fever? He was never able to say
definitively. Even so, many of the numbers speak for themselves. Leeds won 27
of their 46 regular fixtures and accrued 90 points. They scored 81 goals and
finished with a goal difference of plus 38. They came within two games of going
unbeaten at Elland Road and their streak without a league defeat from the start
of January ran for 96 days. In a typical season, it would have been automatic
promotion form all ends up; title form on certain occasions, and his ability to
regroup for United’s play-off semi-final against Norwich was a feather in his
cap.
It is one of a number of reasons why sources close to the
49ers have indicated over the past few weeks that they were minded to stick
with Farke however the season ended. He has three years left on his contract
and Leeds’ owners believe the general picture of his performance is a positive
one, regardless of Sunday’s defeat. They like his demeanour and temperament,
and they appreciate the fact that he does not often talk himself into trouble
with the media. They have already discussed plans for pre-season in Europe.
Moreover, to this point they have heavily backed him, with recruitment and a
squad Farke specifically asked for. And results as a whole were very strong.
Much as they would have gladly taken it, the 49ers did not
demand that Farke find a way out of the Championship at the first attempt. It
was simply accepted that if Leeds took more than one go at escaping the EFL,
profitability and sustainability rules (PSR) would bite them harder. Sales of
certain players will be necessary this summer, the only way of balancing
United’s accounts within the limits of the EFL’s financial rules, and the next
tranche of player investment will be aimed at promotion again. Summerville is
among those expected to exit. The 49ers still expect to get the top-flight
asset they wanted, albeit by way of an extended detour through a lower league.
For Farke, defeat to Southampton today removes the freedom to step back and breathe. The past month was his lesson in the maddening tension and unpredictability of Leeds, a club who have now failed to win the play-offs in six attempts. “Sofa, cake and coffee” is Farke’s way of winding down but June is almost upon him, and there will not be much time for that.