Tactics, recruitment, fitness, squad size: There are so many ways Leeds have gone wrong - The Athletic 5/5/22
By Phil Hay
Marcelo Bielsa, for all his conviction, was never a man of
hubris. He locked into his ideas and he believed in them to his last breath at
Leeds United — but his conviction never strayed into over-confidence. On the
contrary, the long hours of training and the rabbit holes of analysis were the
mark of a coach forever wary of thinking he had it cracked.
Paul Warne, the manager at third-tier Yorkshire neighbours
Rotherham United, used to look at Bielsa on his stool by the dugout and equate
his serene poise with total faith in the outcome of a game but the Argentinian
used intense work to suppress his own doubts. His impact could feel as
effortless as a click of the fingers until you got up close and watched him
cracking the whip, allowing people to cut corners over his dead body.
There was no holiday for him last summer, and when the
post-mortem is written for this season, post-survival or relegation depending
on how the next few weeks from hell work out, the most half-witted conclusion
would be to say that Bielsa assumed Leeds would walk 2021-22. He did not even
assume that he would walk it, which is why he enlisted staff at the club to put
him through a personal fitness programme and improve his physique for another
year of all-in, austere living, as hard as any other.
But here Leeds are with Bielsa gone, their backs against the
wall and no better odds of side-stepping the Championship than the toss of a
coin. Heads you stay up, tails you face the music and either way, nobody is
going to thank the club for the past nine months.
Those of us who thought Leeds would have enough this season
are relying on four games to edge that argument by a whisker. Those who thought
Leeds were bringing knives to a gunfight have, quite honestly, been proven
right already. Second-season syndrome does not look the same from club to club,
but Leeds have suffered their version of it — blown out of the water they were
calmly floating in a year ago.
It would be convenient to hang the regression around the
neck of one person or blame one factor but the failings have been broad. There
are so many ways in which Leeds have gone wrong: tactically; in the calibre of
their recruitment; in keeping their players fit; in carrying an adequate size
of squad and in projecting the image of a club where life is under control.
Draw it all together and the bones of a crisis stick out, an accumulation of
pressure which can easily bury you.
Perhaps people other than Bielsa felt a touch of hubris
after the ease of last season, their first back among the elite at last, or
began to think that the march was unstoppable. Perhaps Leeds’ faith in the
process strayed too close to complacency, though at board level they would
regularly talk about the fact that, statistically, relegation in a club’s
second year after promotion was as much of a threat as it was in their first.
Nobody in the corridors at Elland Road thought this was coming, their fate
staked on the final four games.
Faith is probably the best place to start. When Leeds began
signing players in their first transfer window after promotion, they were
purposely embarking on a two-year project, building a squad that, in their
estimation, would see them safely through last season and this one. It was a
vote of confidence not only in those new arrivals but in the existing group of
players, those who had launched Bielsa’s project and found a way to master the
Championship.
Leeds were backing not only their judgement in the market
but the durability of the promotion squad and the capacity of existing faces to
improve further as the standard got better. Bielsa was happy to stand by them
and built his plan around them. Year one back in the Premier League was
unimaginably comfortable but year two has pushed the envelope too far, exposing
limits and making Leeds look like a squad stuck in a sluggish transition.
Investment is where criticism often focuses but the root of
the club’s deceleration is not investment per se. Leeds have spent on transfers
since promotion — more than enough, Bielsa would always say — and they have not
used outgoing deals to prop up their expenditure. The problem has been the
impact of that investment, particularly for a club who like to tell themselves
that they have a good handle on the transfer market. The money paid out since
promotion has not resulted in permanent elevation.
Robin Koch, at £13 million, still feels like an unknown
quantity at centre-back, infrequently seen in his best position. Diego Llorente
is a known quantity in the sense that you can expect him to be unpredictable.
No argument at all with the deal for Raphinha but Rodrigo, even now, is trying
to find himself and neither Junior Firpo nor Dan James has made a material
difference in transforming the team. It says something that for all the
expenditure, last season’s player of the year was Stuart Dallas. And that when
this season finishes, Dallas’ claim to the same award for 2021-22 will be
stronger than most.
From the end of last season, first-team recruitment began to
feel strangled. There was no new central midfielder in the summer window — no
options to turn to or satisfactory for Bielsa once Chelsea’s Conor Gallagher
chose Crystal Palace as his next loan destination and Lewis O’Brien of
Huddersfield Town was deemed too expensive — and nothing at all in January
after Red Bull Salzburg knocked back two offers for Brenden Aaronson.
There was internal frustration at Bielsa’s refusal to take
alternative midfielders, such as Donny van de Beek of Manchester United or
Harry Winks from Tottenham, but January was a gamble, an inactive month that
took the chance that Leeds would have enough to get by, despite an injury list
which meant, week to week, they barely had enough bodies to fill their bench.
Injuries and a small squad, burning oil and water, the loss of continuity and
match-winners and no sign of it improving quickly. That window more than any
other is where inaction was most dangerous.
Who is to blame for that? It is not in dispute that Bielsa
approved the signings made by Leeds and set tight parameters for the type of
players he wanted. He was never forced to take signings he did not want or did
not rate. The club were hands-off in that respect, in the same way that they
refused to dictate or interfere with Bielsa’s training routine. Autonomy was
what underpinned Bielsa’s peak years and the relationship would not have worked
if Leeds had not been prepared to let him manage as he saw fit.
So much about this season has been wrong, though, and it is
not a great defence for the board to say that when results began to cause
concern and the dressing room looked bare, they left the tail to wag the dog.
Leeds were telling themselves they would be OK in January and saying so
publicly, only to sack Bielsa a month later. For too long, there was inertia on
all sides, a reluctance to bite the bullet, do what had to be done and consider
positive change, on the field or off it. Hindsight reveals so many junctures
where the club and Bielsa could have helped themselves.
Change manifested itself in Bielsa’s dismissal, making way
for Jesse Marsch’s appointment. The short-term wisdom of that decision was
always results-dependent. Survival will allow Leeds to feel vindicated,
convinced as they were that the squad had hit the wall physically and form
would not turn for the better without a new coach. Relegation will fuel the
opinion that they might as well have allowed Bielsa to see the remaining games
through, even if it was true that Leeds had never been more tactically
vulnerable under him than this season.
In the meantime, the under-23s have been collateral damage,
still not clear of relegation from the Premier League 2 top flight after
completing long parts of the year with their best performers seconded to a
weakened first-team squad. The senior players at Leeds posted exceptionally
high physical stats in pre-season, data that promised much, but everyone
misjudged the robustness of the camp. It is also doubtful that anyone clocked
the extreme effect the loss of key players to injuries would have on form.
Owing to the departures of Pablo Hernandez, Gaetano Berardi and Gjanni Alioski,
Leeds were down on numbers from the start.
The upshot is this four-game shootout, starting away to
Arsenal on Sunday, in which Leeds either turn it on or go down. Either way,
acknowledgement of the causes of the tightrope walk will be needed from the
top. Whatever part he played in the decline, Bielsa paid with his job and Leeds
will not get far by making the narrative solely about him — not least because
his first three seasons gave them the platform they craved when Andrea
Radrizzani, Victor Orta and Angus Kinnear first reached out to him in
Argentina.
To do so would ignore where ultimate responsibility at a
football club lies and ignore the reality of where the buck stops.
The lessons are plentiful and, sadly, fairly glaring.
All that remains is the anxious hope that Leeds, as a
Premier League entity, will live to fight another day.